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The Economic Contribution of Stewardship
Contracting: Two Case Studies from the
Mount Hood National Forest
Jean M. Daniels, Max Nielsen-Pincus, Michael Paruszkiewicz,
and Nathan Poage
We conducted an economic analysis of two case study stewardship contracts on the Mount Hood National Forest in western
Oregon. Stewardship contracting has been embraced by some federal managers to achieve restoration goals while providing economic benefits to local communities. Little is known about economic contributions from stewardship contracts,
including how they compare against Secure Rural Schools funding or the century-old payments to counties revenue
sharing system. Using expenditure data from sale purchasers, contractors, and fiscal agents, we developed methodology to track spending and used IMPLAN software to estimate economic contributions and multipliers. Results showed
that (1) commercial thinning, service work, and retained receipts projects all contributed to local economic activity; (2)
expenditures accounted for $4 million in output and generated 36 jobs, with output and job multipliers of 1.42 and 1.82,
respectively; and (3) benefits were distributed across a wider variety of economic sectors than timber harvesting alone.
Keywords: stewardship contracting, Mount Hood National Forest, collaborative forest management, federal
forest policy, Secure Rural Schools

S

tewardship contracting has been
embraced by some national forests as a
way to achieve ecological restoration goals
while simultaneously providing economic
benefits to local communities (Moseley and
Charnley 2014). Stewardship contracts are an
administrative mechanism to combine commercial sales of forest products and contracts
for service work, such as pre-commercial
thinning, trail maintenance, or hazard fuels
reduction. Revenues or receipts from timber
harvest in excess of service costs are called
retained receipts and are held by the forest
to fund restoration projects. In contrast, all

receipts generated from traditional timber
sales are sent to the US Treasury. A century-old policy required the federal government to distribute 25% of federal timber
receipts back to the counties where harvesting occurred to fund public schools, roads,
and other county services (16 USC 500).
After adoption of the Northwest Forest Plan
in 1994, harvests from federal lands in the
Pacific Northwest were curtailed sharply.
Payments to counties fell in step with falling
timber receipts, and growing concerns about
the impact on county services led Congress
to pass the Secure Rural Schools (SRS) and

Community Self-Determination Act of 2000
(P.L. 106–393). SRS funding was intended to
decouple county payments from federal harvest and reduce reliance on timber receipts.
The current SRS authority expires in
2017, and the uncertain future of SRS
funding has implications for federal timber
policy. Under the Secure Rural Schools
Act, an eligible county could elect to receive a Secure Rural Schools Act payment
or a 25% payment, but not both (USDA
Forest Service 2017). Counties receive no
direct payments from stewardship contracting. If counties lose SRS funding permanently, they could again receive 25% of
timber sale receipts. Although stewardship
contracting has been around for nearly two
decades, little is known about their economic contribution to local communities,
and little data exist to compare them against
benefits from traditional timber sales. An
array of assessments have examined the use
of stewardship contracting (Mattor and
Cheng 2015); however, economic analyses
are relatively sparse, especially in evaluating trade-offs forest managers face when
choosing among contracting mechanisms
(Hausbeck 2007).
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The objective of this paper is to formalize a discussion about the economic contribution of stewardship contracts. Using two
case studies from the Mount Hood National
Forest (MHNF) in northwestern Oregon,
we performed an economic assessment of the
commercial thinning and contracted service
work performed by the timber purchaser,
and subsequent restoration work funded
using retained receipts. To date, the literature
contains almost no information about how
retained receipts are used, who gains, and
how they are leveraged within the greater
ecological restoration community. This type
of socioeconomic monitoring could help
inform comparisons between contracting
methods to achieve management goals.
We begin with an overview of stewardship contracting and county payment policy,
and then review the literature on economic
monitoring of restoration and stewardship
contracts. Then we introduce our two case
studies, describe economic contribution
methodology, and present analysis results.
We end by discussing the economic contribution of stewardship contracting and some
trade-offs faced by local forest managers and
county officials.

Stewardship Contracts
Stewardship contracting was developed as
a flexible approach to accelerate the pace
and scope of ecological restoration activities on federal lands. These contracts were
permanently authorized by Congress with
passage of the 2014 Farm Bill and are used
by the Forest Service and Bureau of Land
Management (USDA Forest Service 2014).
They combine elements of timber sales,
because they allow the sale of commercial
forest products, with contracts for service
work, such as pre-commercial thinning,
trail maintenance, and fuel reduction, that
are funded with appropriated dollars.
Two specific authorities in stewardship contracting legislation are particularly
relevant to our analysis. The first is the
ability to trade forest products for service
work, which offsets the cost to accomplish
more work within existing appropriations.
For example, the Forest Service could pay
for culvert repairs and thinning operations using proceeds from any commercial timber sold as part of the project. This
bartering approach has allowed the Forest
Service to achieve resource management
goals without depending on Congressional
appropriations.
2  Journal of Forestry • XXXX 2018

The other relevant authority is that the
forest can keep receipts generated through selling forest products, providing additional funds
for restoration work. If value of timber or other
goods created from a stewardship contracting
project exceeds the cost of contracted service
work, the excess receipts are retained by the
forest. Projects funded using retained receipts
are selected by a local forest collaborative
group. The ability to retain the excess receipts,
rather than send them to the US Treasury, has
enabled the Forest Service to complete forest
restoration projects that may not have been
possible otherwise (GAO 2008). Currently,
all national forests in the Pacific Northwest
Administrative Region of the Forest Service
have used stewardship contracts as part of their
land management activities (Daugherty 2017).

County Payments
With passage of the Payments to States law
in 1908, Congress recognized the need to
compensate local counties containing extensive tracts of federal forestland. Under
the law, the United States Forest Service
(USFS) made payments of 25% of gross
timber sale receipts from each national
forest to the counties where the forests are
located. Payments were allocated based on
the national forest acreage in each county to
help pay for schools, roads, law enforcement,
and other county services (16 USC 500). As
federal harvest levels fell, counties dependent
on the federal timber payments experienced
an alarming decline in funding. In response,
Congress passed the Secure Rural Schools
and Community Self-Determination Act of
2000 (SRS). The law amended the county
timber payments program to allow 72 counties in Oregon, Washington, and northern
California to receive the average of their
three highest timber harvest revenue payments from fiscal year 1986 to 1999 instead
of traditional payments tied to harvesting.
All affected counties in Oregon opted to receive SRS funding instead of federal receipts
sharing payments.
SRS funding replaced timber receipt
sharing with guaranteed levels of payments
not tied to timber sales. The intent was to
provide consistent and reliable support
for counties to help them transition away
from federal timber. SRS funding has been
renewed several times since it expired in
2006, each time at reduced levels. Failure
to reauthorize the Act in 2017 would result
in county payments reverting back to 25%
of timber receipts. Stewardship contracts

represent an opportunity for the federal
managers to achieve restoration and harvest
goals while also contributing to local economies. However, payments from timber sales
were made directly to county governments,
while retained receipts from stewardship
contracts are allocated by local collaborative
groups to fund restoration work. As a result,
some county governments remain averse to
the use of stewardship contracts because of
perceived negative impacts on local county
budgets (Moseley and Charnley 2014).

Monitoring Stewardship
Contracts
Although there are extensive discussions
about biophysical metrics that define successful restoration, monitoring for social
and economic impacts has lagged (Aronson
et al. 2010, Wortley et al. 2013). Wortley
et al. (2013) found that only 3.5% of published peer review articles included social
and economic attributes in monitoring.
A Government Accountability Office report (GAO 2008) noted that stewardship
contracts initially required project-level
socioeconomic and ecological monitoring, but Congress changed the requirement to programmatic monitoring in 2003
(Kerkvliet 2010). The Pinchot Institute for
Conservation (2012) conducted 15 case
studies of Forest Service stewardship contracts, focusing on how agency personnel engaged with non-agency stakeholders with no
mention of social or economic contributions.
Both stewardship contracts and traditional timber sales can generate timber
revenue. They differ, however, because of
the service work performed by the contract
purchaser and the restoration work funded
through retained receipts. The relationship
between stewardship contracts and retained
receipts can be described by the following
equation:
Timber revenue generated
− contracted services = retained
receipts
The contract purchaser is responsible for elements on the left-hand side of the equation.
Contracts are awarded based on quality of
a proposal, expertise, and past contractor
performance as well as bid price. Retained
receipts remain with the forest and are allocated locally, usually through proposals submitted by a forest collaborative group.

There are a few examples of economic
monitoring of stewardship contracts and
forest restoration in the literature. NielsenPincus and Moseley (2013) examined employment and economic impacts of public
investments in forest and watershed restoration in Oregon. Using IMPLAN software
(IMPLAN Group 2015), they estimated
that equipment intensive watershed restoration resulted in 15.7 jobs and an additional
$2,380,186 in total output per $1 million of
public investment, while fish passage projects led to 15.2 jobs and $2,240,281 in total
output effects per $1 million public investment. Kerkvliet (2010) estimated economic
impacts from stewardship contracting using
a case study on the Lolo National Forest in
Montana. The project’s total economic impact included a $23 million increase in final
sales for 206 industry sectors in eight counties, 148 jobs, and a $4.6 million increase
in wages (2003 dollars). Impact multipliers for final demand and employment

were 1.41 and 2.14, respectively. He concluded that the variety of project activities
spread impacts across a wider variety of
economic sectors than timber harvesting
alone. Hjerpe and Kim (2008) examined
economic impacts of a stewardship contract for fuels reduction in the southwest.
Impacts, multipliers, and wood utilization
rates were calculated for fiscal year 2005 for
five national forests and accounted for over
$40 million of output, generated nearly 500
jobs, and provided an economic stimulus to
rural communities.
Collaboration is critical to the success of stewardship contracts. Restoration
projects funded with retained receipts
must be recommended formally by a collaborative group. Mattor (2013) assessed
stewardship contract implementation by
the Forest Service and showed that forests
with active collaborative groups achieved
more management objectives than those
without. Collaborative groups contain

a variety of local stakeholders with data
that could facilitate economic monitoring, such as the contract purchaser and
fiscal agents who administer retained
receipts.

Study Area
Our two case studies were stewardship
contracts located on the Clackamas River
Ranger District of the Mount Hood
National Forest (Figure 1). The MHNF
comprises 1.1 million acres of forestland
in north-central Oregon and straddles
the Cascade mountain range. The forest
includes moist western slopes of Mount
Hood as well as drier east-side forests and
rangelands and encompasses portions of six
Oregon Counties: Clackamas, Multnomah,
Hood River, Jefferson, Marion, and
Wasco (Clackamas Stewardship Partners
2018). Approximately 2 million people live
in proximity to the west side of the forest,
but counties on the east side are sparsely

Figure 1. Mount Hood National Forest and the Clackamas River Ranger District and overlap with northern Oregon counties.
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The Bugeye Stewardship Contract was
awarded in 2009 and included commercial thinning of 301 acres and service
work to place downed woody debris
(DWD) and create habitat snags in the
Clackamas River watershed. Work on the
Bugeye Stewardship Contract was completed in 2011.
K9 and Bugeye were among the
first stewardship contracts implemented
by the MHNF. Both were purchased
by the same firm and generated almost
$350,000 of retained receipts used in
seven subsequent restoration projects.
Three of the retained receipts projects
were located on the MHNF and administered by USFS staff for fish passage improvement, off-highway vehicle damage
repair, and road repairs. The other four
Figure 2. Secure Rural Schools funds for each county containing part of the Mount Hood were fish passage projects located off-forNational Forest, 2004–2015.
est and implemented by the Clackamas
River Basin Council (CRBC), a local
non-profit organization.
populated and rural in character. Almost pooled accounts not tied to an individual
half of the MHNF lies within Clackamas contract.
Data Collection and
County, which Figure 2 shows has received
Organization
the majority of SRS funding for the six Case Study Stewardship
We worked with the Clackamas
counties containing the MHNF (USDA Contracts
Stewardship Partners (CSP), one of three
Forest Service 2018). Overall, SRS fund- We analyzed the economic contributions
collaborative groups recommending projing dropped substantially in 2011; losses to of two stewardship contracts, K9 and
ects for retained receipts on the MHNF.
Clackamas County were greater than other Bugeye, completed on the Clackamas
MHNF staff, the stewardship contract
MHNF counties.
Ranger District. The K9 Stewardship purchaser, and the CRBC all participate
The MHNF is administratively unique Contract was awarded in 2007 and comas members in the CSP. Beginning with
for two reasons important to this paper. pleted in 2011. It included commercial
the contract purchaser, we used a snowball
First, the MHNF was one of the first thinning of 359 acres along with service
sampling strategy (Patton 2014), asking
national forests in Oregon to adopt the contracts for aquatic habitat improvement,
each contractor to identify any subconWyden Authority (Public Law 105–277, precommercial thinning of overstocked
tractors employed on the projects. The
Section 323 as amended by Public Law young Douglas-fir (Pseudotsuga menziepurchaser provided the volume of timber
109–54, Section 434), which authorizes the sii) stands, and road decommissioning.
removed and the name, location, and
USFS to enter into agreements for watershed restoration work on public or private
lands for the protection, restoration, and enManagement and Policy Implications
hancement of fish and wildlife habitat. The
Authority allows the MHNF to use retained
The Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act (SRS) was originally enacted in 2000 to help
receipts for restoration projects located outcounties dependent on receipts from federal timber sales adjust to declining harvest levels following the adopside the forest boundaries, provided that the
tion of the Northwest Forest Plan. Counties opting for SRS funding replaced receiving 25% of federal timber
project benefits the forest (USDA Forest
revenues with guaranteed annual payments decoupled from harvest activity. The Act will expire in 2017,
Service 2005). The second unique element
and unless it is reauthorized, county payments could revert back to dependence on timber sales. Stewardship
of the MHNF is an internal accounting
contracting has been authorized since 2000 to streamline implementation of forest restoration goals on
system designed to track spending associnational forests. Little is known about the magnitude and distribution of economic benefits from them. We
ated with stewardship contracts and report
developed a methodology for project-level economic monitoring and estimated the economic contributions
project-level expenditures to a local colof two completed stewardship contracts on the Mount Hood National Forest in northwestern Oregon. In our
laborative group. Their system allows the
case studies, county-level expenditures on commercial thinning, service work, and retained receipts projects
forest to track receipts and expenditures,
greatly exceeded what could be expected from the payments to counties’ revenue sharing regime. With the
including retained receipts projects, back
uncertain future of SRS funding, this study highlights the importance of project-level economic monitoring to
to a specific stewardship contract. Without
inform comparisons between contracting mechanisms and discussions between federal land managers and
this system, retained receipts are difficult
stakeholders.
to track because they are distributed from
4  Journal of Forestry • XXXX 2018

Table 1. Summary and timber harvest information for the K9 and Bugeye Stewardship Contracts.
Panel A: Summary information for each stewardship contract
Stewardship contract
Award date
Close date

Purchaser bid (receipts)

K9
Bugeye

………………………………...……….($)…………………………………
281,445
73,464
207,981
157,664
9,175
148,489

12/4/2007
8/4/2009

2/14/2011
1/10/2011

Cost of services

Receipts retained

Purchaser county
Skamania, WA
Skamania, WA

Panel B: Volume and destination of material harvested from thinning operations
Stewardship contract

Destination mill
type

K9

Sawmill

Bugeye

Sawmill
Veneer

Volume (mbf )

Fiscal mechanism

Firm county

1,540
360
1,135
2,450
100
578

Sale to mill

Hood River, OR
Skamania, WA

Sale to mill

Hood River, OR
Skamania, WA
Skamania, WA

Firm size (# of
employees)
40
225
105
40
105
35

and service work. We have not included
the identity of any contractors, to maintain confidentiality.
Financial data for retained receipts
projects were obtained from two sources:
(1) USFS staff from the Mount Hood
Supervisor’s Office for on-forest expenditures; and (2) the CRBC, the fiscal agent
for off-forest expenditures. We gathered
details about retained receipt project contractors, expenditures, matching funds,
and in-kind contributions. Economic
contributions from the retained receipts
projects accrued both from direct payments to contractors for the restoration
work, and from management activities of
partners who provided personnel, funding, and other support.
In total, we interviewed staff from the
contract purchaser, MHNF, CRBC, and
four contractors representing 67% of total
contractor payments. Work was categorized
as commercial thinning, service work, or
retained receipts and combined with expenditure and employment data. Retained
receipts were further subdivided into: (1)
direct payments to contractors working on
restoration projects, and (2) expenditures
on project management activities of CRBC
staff and funding partners. We then delineated an “economic contribution zone,”
which contains all of the counties where
contractors who worked on either stewardship contract were located. Mill operations
were not included in the IMPLAN analysis to avoid double counting production
Figure 3. Commercial thinning ($632,124) and goods for services ($73,464) expenditures for inputs to wood-using mills, such as logging
the K9 stewardship contract.– indicates that the same firm completed more than one operation. and trucking, which we obtained directly
from contractor interviews. Including mill
expenditures on all contractors involved with subcontractors between May and operations, as well as inputs to mill operin commercial thinning and service work. December 2014. Our interview objective ations, would model production inputs
We made site visits to conduct interviews was to track all expenditures for thinning twice.
Journal of Forestry • XXXX 2018  5

Figure 4. Disposition of retained receipts, leveraged funds, and in-kind contributions from the K9 stewardship contract (purple boxes
indicate funds leveraged to pay for work referenced in orange boxes).1 Transferred from receipts retained from a different stewardship
contract.

IMPLAN Analysis and
Sectoring Plan
We used IMPLAN data and software to develop an input/output (I–O) model to estimate economic effects. I-O models create a
mathematical map that follows the path of
expenditures as they cycle through a local
economy. Note that we estimated effects
as an economic contribution, rather than
an economic impact (Watson et al. 2007).
An economic impact is the effect of spending that would not have occurred otherwise, such as construction of a new sports
6  Journal of Forestry • XXXX 2018

stadium on a vacant lot in a city that had
no other plans for the lot (Watson et al.
2007). However, for stewardship contracting activities, the baseline for comparison is
not no activity, because work could be accomplished through an alternative contracting mechanism. This was an assumption
we made based on discussion with forest
managers.
IMPLAN estimates three types of
effects: direct, indirect, and induced
(IMPLAN Group 2015). Direct effects are
the change in economic activity resulting
from direct project expenditures. In our case

studies, these are payments that contractors
received directly from contract administrators. The indirect effect reflects increased
economic activity to support those direct contributions, such as a logging firm
purchasing fuel and equipment. Induced
effects represent household consumption by
people working at these firms, as they reinvest wages in goods and services provided
by the local community. The greater the
proportion of local purchases, the greater
the direct, indirect, and induced effects, because resources remain in the community.
Multipliers can then be calculated as the

Figure 5. Commercial thinning ($530,000) and goods for services ($9,175) expenditures for the Bugeye stewardship contract. – indicates
that the same firm completed more than one operation.

ratio of total effects (direct, indirect, and induced) to direct effects for employment and
output. Multipliers provide an estimate of
how many times initial expenditures cycled
through the contribution zone.
Because there is no “ecological restoration” sector in IMPLAN, we developed
a sectoring plan based on expenditure
data from contractor interviews. All contractor payments for harvest or service
work were classified into an economic sector (e.g., logging) and assigned an industry
code using the North American Industrial
Classification System (NAICS). Economic
effects from retained receipts projects were
split into two parts: the direct expenditures
to contractors performing restoration work;
and the labor and administrative contributions of project managers at CRBC and
funding partners. Because the majority of
retained receipts administered by CRBC
were used for fish passage projects, we used
the spending pattern coefficients for fish
passage project management reported in
Nielsen-Pincus and Moseley (2013), which
were estimated at the state level, rather than
for specific counties.
IMPLAN results are summarized for
direct, indirect, and induced effects of the

two stewardship contracts with respect to
employment and overall output. IMPLAN
jobs represent the annual number of fulland part-time jobs supported rather than
full-time equivalents. Output is a gross
measure of production that includes the
value of all intermediate and final goods, a
useful measure of the total flow of economic
activity created by a specific activity.

Results and Discussion
The K9 and Bugeye Stewardship Contracts
were purchased by the same firm located
in Skamania County, WA. The purchaser
paid $439,109 for the two sales (Table 1A).
Commercial thinning from K9 and Bugeye
produced 3,035 MBF and 3,128 MBF of
Douglas-fir, respectively (Table 1B). About
3,990 MBF was processed in Hood River
County, Oregon. The remainder was sold
to two sawmills and one veneer mill in
Skamania County, WA. The contract purchaser paid harvest taxes to the State of
Oregon amounting to $10,623 for K9 and
$11,511 for Bugeye. Table 1A also shows that
K9 and Bugeye generated retained receipts
of $207,981 and $148,489, respectively.
We compiled the work activity with
corresponding industry code, firm location,

employment, and expenditures into flowcharts that represent spending for each
contract, including leveraged funding
and match dollars from restoration partners (Figures 3–6). Commercial thinning
and service work for K9 (Figure 3) drew
contractors from eight counties with total
expenditures worth $705,588. K9 retained
receipts contributed to three aquatic restoration projects and one off-highway vehicle damage repair project (Figure 4).
Grants and in-kind contributions totaling
$319,888 were received from restoration
partners for two off-forest projects. Firms
contracted for the Bugeye thinning and service work received a total of $539,175 and
came from a five-county area (Figure 5).
Retained receipts from Bugeye contributed
to three projects focused on fish passage and
forest road repair, and two projects were leveraged with $484,018 in grants and in-kind
contributions (Figure 6). The majority of
contracted firms were local. Overall, 67.5%
of all contractor payments from K9 and
86.7% of all contractor payments from
Bugeye were received by firms in Clackamas
County. Although we learned how many
people worked on projects, we were unable
to find out the duration of their work.
Journal of Forestry • XXXX 2018  7

Figure 6. Disposition of retained receipts, leveraged funds, and in-kind contributions from the Bugeye stewardship contract (purple boxes
indicate funds leveraged to pay for work referenced in orange boxes).1 Transferred from receipts retained from a different stewardship
contract.

Economic Contribution
We combined county-level expenditures
for commercial thinning, service work,
and retained receipts projects to form a
10-county economic contribution zone
(Figure 7). The zone contains six counties in
Oregon and four in Washington, including
all MHNF counties except Jefferson. The
zone contains both urban and rural counties, so we developed Table 2 to show
8  Journal of Forestry • XXXX 2018

their relative economic size, measured by
number of establishments (USDC Census
Bureau 2017).
Regional employment and output
effects are shown in Table 3. Overall, 21.7
jobs were supported by the two stewardship contracts, with an additional 14.6 jobs
spurred by indirect and induced activities.
Project management activities generated
11.4 total jobs, but only 3.9 jobs were inside

the economic contribution zone. Gross economic output effects occurring within the
zone amounted to $2.38 million, about
60% of the total expenditures. By far, the
majority of economic effects were experienced in Clackamas County, Oregon.
Multipliers were calculated for employment and output effects. The employment multiplier indicates that for every
direct job supported by the stewardship

Figure 7. The economic contribution zone: Counties receiving economic activity from two case study stewardship contracts.
Table 2. Number of establishments by county in the case study economic contribution zone, 2012.1
County

Logging and forestry services

Wood products manufacturing

Paper manufacturing

Total number of establishments

25
18
40
5
4
21
16
8
3
5
14
159

27
23
11
4
1
5
22
27
4
2
37
163

8
8
8
0
0
0
2
20
0
0
9
55

10,944
9,577
2,170
958
355
534
7,600
25,087
178
713
14,234
72,350

Clackamas
Clark
Cowlitz
Hood
Jefferson
Klickitat
Marion
Multnomah
Skamania
Wasco
Washington
Total
1

NAICS codes 113, 321, and 322.

contracts, 1.82 jobs were supported in
other areas of the economy. The economic
output multiplier was 1.42; every dollar
spent on the two stewardship contracts
created another $1.42 in supporting economic activity. We also separated the total
effects into retained receipts project management and all other contracted work and
found output multipliers of 2.9 and 1.4,

respectively, indicating a relatively large
added value for retained receipts projects,
especially for employment.
Economic contributions from the two
case studies are within the range of published results for similar activities. Our employment multiplier of 1.82 was greater
than Kerkvliet (2010) and Hjerpe and Kim
(2008). However, most of the impacts in

Kerkvliet (2010) were from timber harvesting; the proportion of retained receipts in his
study was much smaller than our two case
studies. The Hjerpe and Kim (2008) analysis occurred in Arizona, where harvested
materials were less valuable, potentially
explaining why our employment multiplier
was greater. We found an economic output
contribution multiplier of 2.9 from the
Journal of Forestry • XXXX 2018  9

Table 3. Direct, indirect, and induced effects of case study expenditures on regional employment and output.
Location

Direct effect

Oregon statewide model
Clackamas
Hood River
Marion
Multnomah
Wasco
Washington
Clark
Cowlitz
Klickitat
Skamania
MHNF counties total
Employment total

Indirect effect
Employment
4.4
2.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
2.6
7.2
Output ($)
588,535
196,528
10,109
7,454
6,166
10,456
5,609
8,384
1,910
11,957
1,782
221,613
848,891

3.9
15.4
0.6
0.3
0.1
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.0
0.3
0.1
16.8
21.7

Oregon statewide model
Clackamas
Hood River
Marion
Multnomah
Wasco
Washington
Clark
Cowlitz
Klickitat
Skamania
MHNF counties total
Output total

Induced effect

674,124
1,380,104
64,803
53,948
18,490
56,008
30,605
36,886
8,942
36,886
18,443
1,573,353
2,379,239

Total effect

3.1
3.6
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.1
7.5

11.4
21.2
0.8
0.6
0.2
0.7
0.4
0.5
0.1
0.4
0.2
23.5
36.4

362,056
374,266
12,571
22,943
6,588
11,551
10,768
8,836
2,458
3,987
1,705
427,919
817,730

1,624,715
1,950,899
87,483
84,346
31,244
78,016
46,983
54,106
13,310
52,830
21,929
2,231,988
4,045,860

Table 4. Comparison of the two case study stewardship contracts against a hypothetical 25% of timber receipts distributed to MHNF
counties. Our analysis shows greater economic activity generated by our two case study stewardship contracts than if commercial thinning
operations were accomplished through timber sales. Note that the economic benefits of stewardship contracts primarily accrue to private
sector enterprises, and a substantial amount leaked from the local area.
Service work and retained receipts activities
Retained receipts

County
Clackamas
Hood River
Jefferson
Marion
Multnomah
Wasco
Other
Total

Direct contractor
payments2

Thinning operations

Service work

On-forest

Off-forest

Service and
retained receipts
total

………………………………………..….……….($)…………………….…….…………………….
1,380,121
909,418
47,134
62,515
361,054
470,703
64,803
64,803
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
53,948
18,443
35,505
0
0
35,505
18,693
18,443
0
0
250
250
58,803
58,803
0
0
0
0
131,165
92,215
0
10,250
28,700
38,950
1,707,533
1,162,125
82,639
72,765
390,004
545,408

County revenue
share = Total timber revenue
x 25% = $439,109 x
0.25 = 109,777

Proportion
of service
and retained
receipts
activities by
county

Receipts to
county1

Proportion of
MHNF in the
county

(%)
86.3
0.0
0.0
6.5
<0.1
0.0
7.1
100.0

($)
51,150
21,057
485
6,927
7,927
22,231
0
109,777

(%)
46.6
19.2
0.4
6.3
7.2
20.3
0.0
100.0

Receipts to county were calculated using an area-weighted proportion of a 25% share of commercial thinning revenue to counties containing parts of the Mount Hood National Forest, similar to
what is specified under the 1908 Payments to States law.
2
Only includes payments to contractors directly involved in restoration activities.
1

five fish passage restoration projects funded
after leveraging retained receipts from the
two contracts, which was comparable to
the range of 2.3 to 3.3 reported by NielsenPincus and Moseley (2013).
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Payments to Counties
For illustrative purposes, we calculated
what the payments to counties could look
like using the century-old 25% policy, and
compared them against our two case study

stewardship contracts. Specifically, we distributed 25% of the timber sale value to the
MHNF counties and compared those to
results from the two case studies (Table 4).
We limited our comparison to service work

and retained receipts since receipts from
commercial thinning could be generated
regardless of contracting method. Harvest
operations with a timber sale may have generated nearly $110,000 from commercial
thinning for local county governments, with
almost half going to Clackamas County. In
contrast, the stewardship contracts resulted
in $545,000 in retained receipts that were
distributed in direct payments to contractors and project managers, which were
leveraged by almost $823,000 in contributions from restoration partners. The majority of work funded with retained receipts
was conducted off-forest in Clackamas
County by local contractors. We caution
that the comparison between timber sales
and stewardship contracts is not strictly
“apples-to-apples.” Differences in bidding
criteria create some uncertainty whether the
awarded sale price on a stewardship contract
would mirror the awarded price for a timber
sale. Regardless, like Kerkvliet (2010), we
found that stewardship contracts generate
significant activity in more sectors of an
economy than timber operations alone.
Clackamas County contains about
half of the MHNF, and contractors located
there received 58% of direct payments
(Figure 8). Payments to contractors in
the other MHNF counties (Multnomah,
Hood River, Jefferson, Marion, and
Wasco) combined were a modest 11.5%
of the total. Hood River and Wasco
Counties each contain about 20% of the

forest, but local contractors only received
about 2% of direct payments; no Jefferson
County contractors were involved. About
one-third (34%) leaked outside the
MHNF counties, the majority going to
contractors in Washington state. The proportion of benefits accrued in Clackamas
County was similar to the proportion of
acreage, but the other five Mount Hood
counties received substantially less than
they might with a federal revenue sharing
system. This finding suggests that attracting or training local contractors to perform ecological restoration work could
retain more restoration dollars within the
local community.
Although benefits to the local
economy are considerable, county governments have only indirect incentives to support stewardship contracting. Opposition
could be more likely in counties where federal receipts represent a large proportion of
funding or where commercial timber value
is limited and unlikely to generate retained
receipts, which reduces local economic impact. Stakeholders from four national forests interviewed in Moseley and Charnley
(2014) noted opposition from local officials concerned about county payments
given the uncertainty of SRS funding and
the low value of merchantable material
from their projects. However, Clackamas
County, the location of our case studies,
enjoys a large and diverse economic base
containing part of the Portland, Oregon,

metropolitan area. Unlike more rural
counties, funding from federal land management comprises a small portion of
Clackamas County’s budget. The county
is located in the vicinity of functioning
timber markets and contains local technical
expertise for restoration work. Under these
circumstances, county officials may look
more favorably on stewardship contracts.
In fact, Clackamas County participates in
the Clackamas Stewardship Partners, and
helps recommend retained receipts projects for the MHNF.
One challenge to greater adoption of
stewardship contracting is the reality of declining federal payments to forest-dependent counties with limited economic bases
(Moseley and Charnley 2014). These counties have had decades to reduce reliance on
federal payments, with varying degrees of
success. County officials, forest stakeholders, and policymakers need information
about the economic benefits from stewardship contracts, especially with the uncertain
fate of SRS funding. The two contracts we
analyzed contributed over 36 jobs and $4
million in economic output, nearly 60%
of which occurred in Clackamas County.
However, most of the benefits accrued to
private sector entities. Private enterprises,
in turn, pay taxes and make purchases that
are reflected in indirect and induced economic effects, whereas revenue sharing
from timber receipts are distributed directly
to county governments.

Figure 8. Distribution of direct economic effects from K9 and Bugeye stewardship contracts compared against a typical 25% revenue
sharing distribution for Mount Hood National Forest counties.
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Conclusion
We report results from contractor interviews
and a custom input/output model that estimated economic contributions from two
stewardship contracts on the Mount Hood
National Forest in Oregon. The results
show that economic activity was generated
in a multitude of industrial sectors in a tencounty zone, as well as statewide. This is the
first study we are aware of to quantify the economic contribution of retained receipts at the
project level. Our analysis demonstrates how
economic data could be gathered, analyzed,
and monitored with a methodology that is
generalizable to other western forests with
retained receipts. We attribute our ability to
perform the analysis to the custom accounting system devised by staff on the MHNF
and the presence of a well-established collaborative group. Economic monitoring could
be more broadly conducted if all national
forests adopted an accounting system to
link expenditures back to a particular contract. Finally, we want to emphasize that this
work hinged on assistance from members of
the Clackamas Stewardship Partners, which
attests to the value of forest collaboratives.
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